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of YEN Hsi-shan with the National Government
2. Japanese Units under YEN Hsi-shan

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1. Marshal YEN Hsi-shan, Shansi warlord, has refused several offers from CHIANG Kai-shek, such as the vice-presidency of the National Government and command of the Generalissimo's Peiping Field Headquarters, and has held out for total dominance in China. He has said privately that he has a "master plan" for his control of the entire country.
2. Although the Kuomintang and the National Government are dissatisfied with the situation in Shansi, there is no evidence that the government puts any pressure on YEN or sends its secret agents to supervise his activities. The government still sends large monthly remittances to Shansi to cover the administrative expenses of the province, and it has never shown any opposition to YEN's organizing his Japanese military units and retaining many Japanese advisers and technicians.
3. In his relationship with the Chinese Communists there is no evidence of political negotiations. Many Chinese Communist underground workers have penetrated Taiyuan (112-30,37-42), but they are dealt with summarily and severely when apprehended. The Chinese Communists have no intention of occupying Taiyuan by military force because they are anxious to preserve its industry; they believe they can obtain part of the production if they allow YEN to continue operating it (F-6).
4. YEN places his personal safety above all other considerations and is easily influenced by the prospect of profitable political plots. If worst comes to worst in Shansi, he will either go abroad, seek the aid of the USSR, or come to an agreement with the Chinese Communists. As the situation now stands, he will not take any decisive political step, and he even disregards the plan for a joint defense with Generals HU Tsung-nan and FU Tso-yi (F-6) (See [redacted]).
5. YEN hopes to obtain machine tools and other production necessities from the United States and Japan. Negotiations have been initiated between PENG ([redacted]), manager of the Northwestern Corporation and director of all economic enterprises in Shansi, and certain Americans in Shanghai for the import of these materials (F-2). An employee of the Northwest Corporation

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named NAGAI (永井) has been entrusted with the task of purchasing them in Japan. NAGAI is planning to return to Japan with the next group of Japanese repatriates.

6. The following is a list of important persons among the approximately 850 Japanese in the current voluntary repatriation from Shansi:

Lt.Gen. MIURA (三浦)	Former division commander at Yuncheng (110-51,35-06)	25X1A2g
Maj.Gen. YAMAOKA (山岡)	Former chief of staff of the Japanese Army in Shansi, and adviser to YEN Hsi-shan (previously reported in [REDACTED])	
Col. ONDA (恩田)	Former gendarmerie commander in Shansi	
Col. SUGINO (杉野)	Former commander of the Signal Corps, Shansi	

7. The total number of Japanese remaining in Shansi is approximately 4,500, among whom are about 300 women and 300 children. The following is a list of prominent Japanese remaining in the province:

Lt.Gen. SUMIDA (Raishiro) (澄田)	Former commander in chief of the Japanese First Army in Shansi
Col. KAWAMOTO (川本)	Currently chief adviser to the Northwest Corporation
Lt.Col. MINO (三野)	Currently political adviser to YEN
Maj.Gen. HIODO (兵頭)	Of the Medical Corps
Maj. IWATA (岩田)	Former staff officer of the Japanese Army in Shansi; currently adviser in the commander's headquarters
Maj.Gen. MOTOIZUMI (元泉)	(Washington Comment. Possibly Maj.Gen. MOTOIZUMI Kaoru, formerly commanding general of 14 Independent Infantry Brigade.)
Col. IMAMURA (今村)	Currently commander in chief of the Japanese troops in Shansi
Capt. KIKUCHI (菊池)	Currently chief of staff of the Japanese units
Lt.Col. FUJIMOTO (藤本)	Former instructor in the Paoting (115-29, 38-52) Military Academy
Maj. AKABOSHI (赤星)	Currently commander of the Japanese Mechanized Unit
1st Lt. SHIRONO (城野)	Graduate of Tokyo Imperial University; currently in charge of propaganda in the intelligence office

8. YEN's military strength includes 40 corps, 6 of which are composed of Japanese troops. Including civilian reserves, YEN can mobilize up to 800,000 men if absolutely necessary; however, only 100,000 of these are regulars. Around Taiyuan there are over 1,500 pillboxes and other defense works, all of which were built under Japanese supervision. All officers and men of the Shansi army are given Japanese military training. To prevent the decrease in the strength of the Japanese units caused by the current repatriation, YEN has entrusted some of the repatriates with the task of recruiting volunteers from Japan.

9. The combined Shansi army is composed of ten combat units, each of which is called a "general unit", equivalent to a division. Each general unit is

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composed of a certain number of "corps", which are equivalent to regiments, special units, and a training unit. The Japanese troops comprise the 10 General Unit of YEN's forces. The Japanese units are composed of all Japanese, regardless of sex, excluding only babies and aged persons. Therefore, the true number of fighting men in a unit is much smaller than the total number of persons in the unit. Also there is no fixed number of persons in a unit.

10. In the list following are the names, the number of Japanese, and the locations of the Japanese units; and the names and Japanese Army ranks of their commanders (the ranks in parentheses are those currently held in YEN's Shansi army):

10 General Unit Headquarters: Former Japanese Army Headquarters, Taiyuan
Total number (no.) of persons: 3,050

Commander Col. IMAMURA (Lt.Gen.)
Chief Adjutant 1st Lt. NAGANO (長野)(Maj.Gen.)
Chief of Staff Capt. KIKUCHI (菊池)(Maj.Gen.)

1 Corps Tungshan (東山)(east of Taiyuan)(East Mountain)
No: 600

Commander 1st Lt. ODAGIRI (小田切)(Maj.Gen.)

2 Corps Tungshan No: 150

Commander Capt. SAE (佐大)(Maj.Gen.)

3 Corps Yutzu (112-44,37-39) No: 500

Commander NAGATOMI (永壽)(Col.), formerly security chief in the North China Communication Corporation

4 Corps Taiyuan No: 200

Commander Capt. MATSUDA (松田)(Col.)

6 Corps Taiyuan, near the railway station No: 600

Commander Capt. FUKAWA (有川)(Maj.Gen.)

Mechanized Unit About 5 miles south of Taiyuan No: 200

Commander Maj. AKABOSHI (Maj.Gen.)
Deputy Commander Capt. NOYAMA (野山)(Col.)

Signal Unit No: 300

Commander 1st Lt. TOMONAGA (友永)(Maj.Gen.)

1 Signal Unit Wireless unit, in the city of Taiyuan

Commander 1st Lt. TOMONAGA

2 Signal Unit Wire unit, outside of the city of Taiyuan

Commander HIURA (日浦)(Lt.Col.), former electrical technician

Engineer Unit 5 miles outside of Taiyuan No: 300

Commander SUZUKI (鈴木)(Maj.Gen.), former civil engineer
Deputy Commander UCHIKAWA (内川)(Maj.Gen.), former civil engineer

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Artillery Unit 5 miles outside of Taiyuan No: 200
 Commander Capt. MATSUBARA (松原) (Maj.Gen.), former battery commander

Training Unit 5 miles outside of Taiyuan
 Divided into the New Recruits' Training Unit and the People's Training Unit

(Source Comment. The 5 Corps was disarmed by the Chinese Communist Army at Yangchuan (113-36,37-50). The commander and his adjutant were captured and put to death. The 5 Corps is non-existent at present.)

11. Only about 900 of the total number of persons in these units have received military training in the Japanese Army. Each corps is composed of a number of companies, and each company, of three platoons. Their armament includes rifles, light and heavy machine guns, field and mountain guns, artillery, and tanks. They have no aircraft. Of the arms and ammunition of the former Japanese Army in Shansi, about 30 percent is believed to have been captured by the Chinese Communists, and about 70 percent is in the hands of YEN's army and the Japanese units. The following is a list of the arms and equipment possessed by the Japanese units:

Rifles	5,000
Light machine guns	150
Heavy machine guns	50
Field and mountain guns	20
Heavy field pieces	8
Various vehicles	200
Light tanks	30

12. The Japanese units are under the full command of Col. IMAMURA, who is directly responsible to YEN Hsi-shan. However, YEN has placed Chinese Lt.Gen. CH'AO Ch'eng-shou (趙承授) between himself and IMAMURA as a go-between. YEN employs Maj. IWADA as his adviser in headquarters and Lt.Gen. SUMIDA as his top military adviser, although WANG Shih-kuo (王世國) is the highest-ranking military man under YEN and is commander of the Bandit Suppression Headquarters in Shansi (See [REDACTED])

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13. The various corps differ markedly in fighting power. The 6 Corps, under Capt. FUKAWA, is the strongest unit because the majority of its fighting men were formerly in the Japanese Army; while the 3 Corps and the Engineer Unit, which were organized mainly from among Japanese civilians, have little fighting ability and military discipline.
14. On the whole, the morale, fighting spirit and sense of duty in the Japanese units are low in comparison to those of the former Japanese Army. During the almost three years since the Japanese surrender, many of the troops in the Japanese units have begun to think of their own future and to entertain doubts as to their purpose in remaining in Shansi. This causes in part the low morale, which also finds roots in the lack of pleasant leisure activities and Japanese women. But the greatest cause of low morale and disunity is the incompetence of some of the commanders. Col. IMAMURA, Capt. FUKAWA and Maj. AKABOSHI are working hard to maintain strict military discipline among their men and to uphold the tradition of the former Japanese Army, but in the temporarily organized units there is almost no discipline. The men refer to their commanders as "the old man" and refuse to view army life with a cooperative attitude. They receive military training and "thought" education, but the training periods are short.

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15. Other factors affecting the morale and unity of the Japanese are those persons who hope for an early signing of the Japanese peace treaty so that they may remit their money freely to Japan and acquire the rights of foreign nationals in China; and the ill will between former regular army officers and the civilians who were recruited after the war, because the former have been given high ranks while the "civilian" soldiers are usually given the lowest rank, warrant officer. Other Japanese hope for an early outbreak of Russo-American hostilities to create some new, advantageous condition in North China.
16. In spite of the morale problem, the Japanese units remain fairly strong. There has not been a battle between the Chinese Communists and the Japanese troops since YEN's re-entry into Taiyuan after the Japanese surrender. 25X1X6
~~Comment.~~ The disarmament of the 5 Corps was not the result of a successful Chinese Communist attack, but the result of a plot.) Since the Japanese are entrusted with special privileges in Shansi, a special system of punishment has been evolved to uphold military discipline within the units. The commanders have absolute authority to deal with those who violate military discipline, and they may order the summary execution of those who infringe on the rights and property of the Chinese, commit rape, rebel, or harbor "unsound" ideas.
17. YEN has given the Japanese of lowest rank, including the women, the title of warrant officer and CNC \$6,000,000 a month, plus a monthly ration of 47 catties of white flour. Up to the present, the Japanese units have been supplied from stockpiles stored up at the time of the Japanese surrender, and they still have about half of their original supply left. In view of the food shortage, however, and the surplus of paper currency in the province, the Japanese in the units are cultivating cereals and vegetables and raising domestic animals.
18. The majority of Japanese who do not belong to the Japanese units are employed as advisers, technicians and foremen in YEN's various enterprises. At present the highest-ranking Japanese adviser in the Northwest Corporation is Col. KAWAMOTO, formerly senior adjutant in the Kuantung Army and later connected with the South Manchurian Railway. He is also head of the Japanese Residents Association in Shansi. There are about 160 other Japanese working in the various departments of the Northwest Corporation. While the lack of a free economy prevents private Japanese enterprises, a small number of individual Japanese own dance halls, restaurants, and barber shops, and engage in the medical profession or brokerage business.
19. YEN plans to retrain his whole Shansi army according to Japanese standards. The Japanese instructors are emphasizing the training of officers, and are retraining them from the basic fundamentals, such as bayonet techniques, up.
20. YEN's chief political secretary is LIANG Hua-chih (梁化之), while his top over-all adviser is SU T'i-jen (蘇倬仁), YEN's brother-in-law (See [REDACTED]).

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